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INTRODUCTION

Throughout the survey period' the Fifth Circuit decided a
number of cases addressing various evidentiary problems. All of
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law. B.A.,
Texas A&M University, 1969; J.D., Baylor University, 1971; LL.M., University of Virginia,
1981. Reporter, Federal Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules and Evidence, 1988-89. The
author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Ms. Amy Bitter in the preparation of this
article.
1. June 1, 1987 through May 31, 1988.
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the cases discussed here relate in one way or another to a specific
federal rule of evidence. Although several cases provided the court
with the first occasion to address particular issues-for example the
2
admissibility of a civil deposition in a subsequent criminal case the bulk of cases simply carry forward precedent.
Ii.

PRESERVATION OF ERROR

If there is one elementary rule that pervades all of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, it is the requirement that counsel properly object
and preserve evidentiary errors.' It is no mistake that the rules
governing this important topic are prominently located in article I
of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 4 Two cases from the Fifth Circuit
during the survey period serve as reminders of this need to preserve
error.
In Fischer v. Dallas Federal Savings & Loan Association' the
appellants were unsuccessful loan applicants who filed individual
and class action suits against the appellee bank alleging that the
latter had violated, inter alia, the Fair Housing Act and the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act by refusing to grant loans for property
located in minority areas. 6 During discovery the appellants requested
the appellees to produce copies of three documents relating to
Federal Home Loan Bank Board memoranda and investigations. 7
The trial court ruled that these documents were protected from
disclosure by the Bank Board's regulations.' At trial the appellants
offered copies of the requested documents that they had obtained
from other sources. 9 The trial court, however, relying on the earlier
discovery ruling, ruled them inadmissible. I0 The Fifth Circuit noted
that the appellant's argument for admissibility had some merit
because the Bank Board regulations only proscribe certain disclosures, not necessarily any use once the documents have been made

2.

United States v. McDonald, 837 F.2d 1287 (5th Cir. Feb. 1988).

3.

See generally E.

CLEAR.Y,

MCCORIMCK ON EVIDENCE

(discussing the need to object to evidence).
4. See FED. R. EVID. 103.
5. 835 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. Jan. 1988).
6. Id. at 568.
7. Id.
8. Id. (citing 12 C.F.R. § 505.5(a)).
9. Id.
10. Id.

§ 52, at 126 (3d ed.

1984)
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public." The appellants, however, failed to preserve error because
they did not make any offer of proof on the documents as required
by rule 103(a)(2).12 The court noted that while the trial court had
heard arguments on the admissibilty of the documents, the record
was devoid of any indication that two of the documents were
actually presented to the trial judge for his consideration." Thus,
the appellants had not made an offer of proof "sufficient to allow
intelligent review.' 1 4 With regard to the third document, the court
found no possible harm requiring reversal. 5
Although this case is problematic, it is consistent with earlier
decisions by the court which emphasize the need for an adequate
offer of proof. 6 The case indicates that where the evidence in
question is in documentary form, counsel should, at a minimum,
present the document to the trial judge for consideration and ask
that the document be included in the record. This will permit the
judge, under rule 103(b), to add any comments for the record to
show the character of the offered evidence.
In a subsequent case, the Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of
using motions in limine 7 to preserve error. In Wilson v. Waggener s
the appellant brought an action against his former employer for
breach of an agreement to purchase stock.' 9 Before trial, the appellant made a motion in limine asking that the court block any
evidence relating to his duty to remain within the employment of

11. Id. at 568-69.
12. Id. at 569; see FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(2).
13. 835 F.2d at 569.
14. Id. An argument could be made that under rule 103(a)(2), the arguments made to the
court, which would presumably have indicated some of the nature of the documents, might
have been sufficient. The rule only requires that "the substance of the evidence was made
known to the court by offer or was apparentfrom the context within which questions were
asked." FED. R. EviD. 103(a)(2) (emphasis added).
15. 835 F.2d at 569.
16. See, e.g., Petty v. Ideco, 761 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1985); Mercado v. Austin Police
Dep't, 754 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1985).
17. The topic of motions in limine are not specifically noted in the Federal Rules of
Evidence but are a recognized vehicle for obtaining rulings on evidentiary issues before the
issues arise at trial. See generally S. SALTZBUtGR & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
MANUAL 19-21 (4th ed. 1986) (noting United States Supreme Court case law allowing motions
in limine).
18. 837 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. Feb. 1988).
19. Id. at 220-21.
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the appellee. 20 The trial court denied the motion and the appellant
failed to object at trial when that evidence was introduced, thus
waiving the issue. 2 ' The Fifth Circuit noted that while rule 103(a)(1)
requires that, "to preserve the admission of evidence as error for
appellate review, an objection must be made at trial," ' 22 nonetheless,
2
a motion in limine is insufficent in itself to preserve the issue. 1
Thus, if the motion is denied, the objection must be renewed at
trial. 24 Examining the record, the court concluded that admission
25
of this evidence was not plain error.
III.

RELEVANCE

As a threshold to the introduction of evidence, counsel must
show that the proferred evidence is "relevant. ' 26 In the words of
rule 401, evidence is relevant if it tends "to make the existence of
any fact of consequence to the determination of the action more
'27
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
Assuming that this hurdle, which is sometimes referred to as "logical
relevance," is cleared, 2 counsel must still clear the "legal relevance"
hurdle, that is, the judge's authority to exlude otherwise relevant
evidence because of intrinsic or extrinsic policy considerations. 29 For
example, the fact that the defendant has committed similar crimes
might be logically relevant to the issue of whether he committed
the crime charged. 30 But rule 404(b) might require exclusion because
of policy considerations which recognize the potential dangers of

20. Id. at 222. The appellant unsuccessfully argued that to admit such evidence would
violate Louisiana's parol evidence rule. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
Petty v. Ideco, 761
24. Id. This is consistent with earlier Fifth Circuit cases. See, e.g.,
F.2d 1146, 1150 (5th Cir. 1985); Collins v. Wayne Corp., 621 F.2d 777, 784 (5th Cir. 1980).
25. 837 F.2d at 222.
26. See FED. R. EvID. 402.
27. Id. 401. This is a very low threshold and trial judges are granted broad discretion in
deciding whether, under rule 401, the evidence is admissible.
28. See generally E. CLEARY, MCCOIiM CK ON EVIDENCE § 185, at 542 (3d ed. 1984)
(stating that "evidence that is probative is often said to have 'logical relevance' ").
29. Rule 403 is generally considered to reflect intrinsic policy grounds for excluding
otherwise logically relevant evidence: e.g., waste of time, confusion of the issues, and cumulativeness. See FED. R. EvID. 403.
30. See S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 183 (4th ed.
1986).
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linking the defendant with other criminal acts.31 In deciding whether
to admit the evidence, the trial court traditionally balances the
2
probative value against the probative dangers of the evidence.1
Several Fifth Circuit cases during the survey period address these
points.
A.

Relevant But Repetitious Evidence

In United States v. Thompson33 the defendant was charged with
conspiring to receive, conceal, transport, and store stolen dynamite.3 4 After stealing 900 pounds of dynamite, the defendant stored
it in a mini-storage facility in San Antonio. 5 At trial an explosives
expert for the prosecution testified that the destructive power of
the stolen dynamite would reach approximately 1000 feet from where
it was stored.3 6 Other witnesses previously testified that dynamite
was indeed an "explosive" and the jury had seen a film demonstrating a sample of dynamite being detonated.3 7 The court noted
the broad discretion granted trial judges and concluded that while
the expert's testimony was relevant to prove that dynamite is an
explosive, it was repetitious of earlier evidence. 8 The court concluded, however, that even assuming the trial judge abused his
discretion in balancing the probative value against the probative
dangers, the error was harmless.3 9
B.

Admissibility of Mug Shots: A New Test

In United States v. Torres-Flores40 the Fifth Circuit concluded
that the trial judge committed reversible error in striking the rule
403 balance in favor of admissibility. 41 The defendant was charged

31.
32.

Id. at 183-84.
Id. at 184.

33.

837 F.2d. 673 (5th Cir. Feb. 1988), cert. denied, __

U.S. __

, 109 S. Ct. 89, 102

L. Ed. 2d 65 (1988).
34. Id. at 674.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 676.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 677.
39. Id. The court based that conclusion on the fact that no reference to the expert's
"brief testimony" was made during closing arguments and the evidence of guilt was overwhelming. Id.
40. 827 F.2d 1031 (5th Cir. Sept. 1987).
41. Id. at 1039-40.
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with firing several shots at a border patrolman.4 2 Identification of
the defendant as the assailant was the only real issue at trial and
the patrolman was the only witness to identify the defendant.4 3 The
patrolman indicated that several months after the incident he was
looking through a stack of photographs in the border patrol locker
room and noticed the picture of a man resembling the man who
had shot at him. 4 The photograph was of the defendant and had
been taken several months earlier for an unrelated arrest.4 5 At trial
the photographs, which defense counsel characterized as a "rogues'
gallery," were admitted over the defendant's objections.4746 The trial
judge, however, gave a limiting instruction to the jury.
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the prejudicial dangers of
these photographs, specifically "the possibility that the photographs
impressed upon the jury impermissible evidence of bad character,"
substantially outweighed their probative value. 4 The court noted
that some courts have admitted photographs of a defendant if all
police or prison markings have been completely deleted 49 but that
failure to remove markings renders the photographs inadmissible
because it paints the defendant as having a bad character. 0 Two
other circuits, moreover, have concluded that even masking the

42. See id.at 1032.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1033. The nine photographs had been taken by the border patrol and were
identified as those of "smugglers, transvestites." Id. Eight of the nine photographs bore some
notations such as "river bandit," "thief," and "robbery suspect." Id. Although the notations
on the defendant's picture had been masked, the other photographs had not been altered
thereby allowing the jury to see the various notations. Id.
47. Id. at 1035. The trial judge instructed the jury in part:
Please understand that the only reason you are to consider these pictures is for the
information as to whether they were pictures that [the border patrolman] used when
he went through the pictures. But you are to disregard any statement with regards
to any allegation of any other crime that may be written on there and you cannot
consider that for purposes of returning a verdict in this case.
Id. at 1035 n.6.
48. Id. at 1040.
49. Id. at 1036; see, e.g., Reiger v. Christensen, 789 F.2d 1425, 1430 (9th Cir. 1986);
Huerta v. State, 390 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965).
50. 827 F.2d at 1036; see, e.g., United States v. Scott, 494 F.2d 298, 301 (7th Cir. 1974).
See generally Annotation, Admissibility, and Prejudicial Effect of Admission, of "Mug Shot, "
"Rogues' Gallery" Photograph, or Photograph Taken in Prison, of Defendant in Criminal
Trial, 30 A.L.R.3d 908 (1970) (comprehensive review of federal and state cases dealing with
the admissibility of "mug shots").
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notations does not remove the improper connotation." Although
the issue had been raised in previous Fifth Circuit cases, the court
noted that whatever error may have occurred in those cases was
considered harmless because either the defendant admitted a prior
criminal record or evidence of guilt was overwhelming.5 2 In TorresFlores, however, the defendant's identification was paramount to
the case and there was no other strong evidence of guilt. 3 Furthermore, the court pointed out that it has cautioned in the past that
prosecutors should take care in introducing mug shots and that such
4
cases might be reversed in the future.1
The court adopted the "tripartite test" set out in United States
6
v. Fosher" and United States v. Harrington:1
1. The Government must have a demonstrable need to introduce
the photographs;
2. The photographs themselves, if shown to the jury, must not
imply that the defendant has a prior criminal record; and
3. The manner of introduction at trial must be such that it
does not draw particular
attention to the source or implications
7
in the photographs.
Applying that template to these facts, the court concluded first,
that the Government needed to introduce the photographs into
evidence. 8 Second, the inartful manner of masking the defendant's
photograph while the other photographs were not masked at all
created a substantial probability that the exhibits impressed upon
the jury the defendant's prior criminal record. 59 Third, the character
of the photographs, despite the trial judge's attempt to "cautiously

51. 827 F.2d at 1036; see United States v. Fosher, 568 F.2d 207, 215 (1st Cir. 1978);
Barnes v. United States, 365 F.2d 509, 510 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
52. See 827 F.2d at 1038; see, e.g., United States v. Davis, 487 F.2d 112, 121 (5th Cir.
1973) (defendant testified as to prior felony conviction), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 981 (1974);
United States v. Rixner, 548 F.2d 1224, 1226 (5th Cir.) (there was other "strong evidence"
against the defendant), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 932 (1977).
53. See 827 F.2d at 1038.
54. Id. (noting United States v. Rixner, 548 F.2d 1224, 1226 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 932 (1977)).
55. 568 F.2d 207, 214 (1st Cir. 1978).
56. 490 F.2d 487, 494 (2d Cir. 1973).
57. 827 F.2d at 1037 (quoting United States v. Harrington, 490 F.2d 487, 494 (2d Cir.
1973)).
58. See id. at 1039. The court stated that "[tihe matter of identification was the crux of
the Government's case." Id.
59. See id.

TEXAS TECH LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 20:427

guide" the prosecutor, was clearly evident at trial. 60 Thus, the Fifth
Circuit determined that the trial court committed prejudicial error
photographs and that the defendant was entitled
in admitting the
6
to a new trial. '
C.

Uncharged Misconduct: Establishing Independent Relevance

The admissibility of uncharged misconduct was also raised in
Torres-Flores62 where, as noted in the preceding discussion, the
defendant was charged with firing shots at a border patrolman
before fleeing back across the border into Mexico. 6 A key issue in
the trial was the identity of the assailant and at trial the court
allowed testimony to the effect that the defendant had been apprehended at the same border point on two occasions, once before and
once after the alleged assault on the patrolman. 64 Citing its earlier
decision in United States v. Beechum, 65 the court stated that in

deciding the admissibility of other crimes or bad acts, a two-step
analysis under rule 404 is required. 66 First, evidence of the extrinsic
act must be "relevant to an issue other than the defendant's
character." ' 67 Second, in accordance with rule 403, the probative
value of this evidence must not be substantially outweighed by its
undue prejudice. 6 The court added that when uncharged misconduct
is offered to prove identity, there must be a greater degree of
similarity between the charged and uncharged acts. 69 Applying this
analysis to the facts, the court concluded that evidence that the
defendant visited the same area before and after the alleged assault
bore on the probability of his presence there at the time of the

60. See id. The patrolman testified that the photographs were kept in the border patrol
station and that they represented "thiefs, transvestites." Id.
61. See id. at 1040. The court indicated that a trial court "must be active in protecting
the jury from hearing about the source and implications of the photographs." Id. at 1039.
The court added that "it should have been stipulated that the source of the photographs
would not be brought out on direct examination." Id.
62. Id. at 1033-35.
63. See id. at 1032.
64. Id. at 1033.
65. 582 F.2d 898, 911 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979).
66. See 827 F.2d at 1034.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. (citing United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1045 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 847 (1978)).
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assault and was highly probative. 70 The court also concluded that
the danger of prejudice did not outweigh the probative value since
the prosecution had not indicated for what crimes the defendant
had been apprehended on the other two occasions and since the
judge adequately protected the defendant's rights by instructing the
7
jury not to consider the offered evidence on the issue of propensity. 1
Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting this extrinsic offense evidence 7 2 the court nonetheless
directed that on retrial it is a "fairer and wiser practice" to limit
this sort of testimony. 73 Thus, it instructed the trial court to limit
evidence to the fact that the defendant had been "observed" at the
particular border point on two occasions.7 4 While the prosecution
witnesses could testify as to what they observed the defendant doing
on the other occasions, the prosecution must be careful not to bring
75
out evidence of other crimes.

This advice is sound. Although rule 404(b) permits evidence of
uncharged misconduct, this case demonstrates that in many cases
the prosecution may avoid potential problems of reversible error by
recharacterizing the extrinsic offense evidence. 76 The more detail
presented about those offenses, the greater the danger that the jury
will place undue emphasis on those offenses and, despite the judge's
instructions, consider that evidence as "propensity" character evidence.

77

D. Uncharged Misconduct: The Value of Instructions
Assuming that the court admits evidence of extrinsic offenses
or uncharged misconduct, it is important that limiting or cautionary
instructions be given to the jury to the effect that the evidence is
not an indication that the defendant committed the charged offense. 7 Failure to give such instructions may result in reversible
error.

79

70.

Id.

71.

Id. at 1034 & n.4.

72.
73.

Id.
See id. at 1040.

74. Id.
75. Id.

76. See id.at 1033-35.
77. See id. at 1040.
78.

See FED. R. EVID. 105.

79.

See, e.g., United States v. Yopp, 577 F.2d 362, 365-66 (6th Cir. 1978).
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The adequacy of such limiting instructions was raised in United
States v. Chase ° where the defendant, along with three other
defendants, was charged with various drug offenses, including possession with intent to distribute cocaine.8 At trial the defense
portrayed the defendant as a person who used cocaine but who had
never sold the substance.8 2 Thus, during both the prosecution's and
defense's argument, there was extrinsic evidence of other drug
offenses. 83 The judge cautioned the jury that:
The government has offered testimony and exhibits regarding
matters not charged in the indictment as crimes or offenses. This
evidence, even if you find it to be believable, in whole or in
part, is not evidence that defendants committed the crimes charged
in this case but is only background information to assist you in
determining matters such as the defendants' motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, or identity. The defendants
are on trial only for the charges in the indictment. Do not
has failed to prove these charges
convict them if the government
84
beyond a reasonable doubt.

There was apparently no attempt to distinguish between the
defendants and the instructions made no specific mention regarding
the various incidents of uncharged misconduct. 85 On appeal Chase
argued that the instruction was inadequate because it should have
been connected with each witness who testifed that he had previously
used cocaine. 8 6 The court summarily rejected this argument noting
that some of the extrinsic offense evidence was actually not "extrinsic" because it related to the conspiracy count.8 7 In any event,
the instruction was considered adequate. 88
Although the instruction was considered adequate under the
circumstances of the case, 9 a better practice would be to tailor the

80. 838 F.2d 743 (5th Cir. Feb. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Mesa v. United States,
U.S.
-,
108 S. Ct. 2022, 100 L. Ed. 2d 609 (1988).
81. Id. at 745. The defendants were charged with drug-related offenses arising out of
what the court characterized as "a large organization that imported and distributed cocaine
in the Dallas area." Id.
82. Id. at 746.
83. See id. at 746-47.
84. Id. at 747.
85. See id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 748 n.2.
88. Id. at 748.
89. Id.

-
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instruction to the purpose for which the prosecution offered the
extrinsic evidence. In this instance, the court typified the extrinsic
offense evidence as "background" information which could be used
to determine any one of the factors listed in rule 404(b) as independent reasons for admitting uncharged misconduct. 90 It would
not be inappropriate for the court to ask the prosecution to specify
the reasons the evidence is being offered and then, assuming the
evidence is admitted, to limit the jury's consideration of the evidence
for that reason.
IV.

A.

WITNESSES AND CREDIBILITY

Impeachment Through Bias: The Paid Informant

One of the most time-honored methods of impeaching a witness
is through a showing that the witness is biased. 9l Although the
Federal Rules of Evidence do not specifically provide for this
method, 92 the courts have nonetheless recognized its important role
in trial advocacy. 93
The Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of impeachment through
bias in United States v. Rizk 94 where a government informant was
paid $15,000 for his activities in ferreting out drug activity by
posing as an interested drug buyer. 95 Although the agreement of
payment was in the form of a contingent fee arrangement, full
payment was made before trial began. 96 The defendants argued that
the prosecution's disclosure of the arrangements with the informant
did not comply with the requirements of United States v. CervantesPacheco.97 The Fifth Circuit, in Cervantes-Pacheco, had held that

90. Id. at 747; see FED. R. EvrD. 404(b).
91. See, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-18 (1974).
92. See H. WENDORF & D. SCHLUETER, TEXAS RuLEs OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 249 (2d ed.
1988); cf. TEX. R. Crv. EvD. 613(b); TEX. R. CRiM. EVID. 612(b) (Identical rules that provide,
in part, that before evidence may be allowed showing bias of a witness, the witness must first
have an opportunity to view the impeaching evidence and either explain or deny such. If the
witness unequivocally admits such bias, extrinsic evidence will not be allowed.).
93. See 415 U.S. at 316-18.
94. 833 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. Nov. 1987), cert. denied, U.S. , 109 S. Ct. 90, 102
L. Ed. 2d 66 (1988).
95. Id. at 524-25.
96. Id. at 525.
97. Id. (citing United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. Aug. 1987) (en
banc), cert. denied sub nor. Nelson v. United States, U.S.
-,
108 S. Ct. 749, 98 L.
Ed. 2d 762 (1988)).
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the testimony of a paid government informant is admissible if four
requirements are met: First, the government cannot deliberately use
or encourage the use of perjured testimony. 98 Second, the government must have made a complete and timely disclosure of the
arrangement. 99 Third, the defendant must have had an adequate
opportunity to cross-examine both the informant and the agents
regarding the fee arrangements. 100 Finally, the trial court must
instruct the jury that the credibility of a witness who has been paid
0 If these
for his testimony is suspect. I1
requirements are met, the
jury may then, as in any other case, decide the issues of credibility
and weight.10 2
In Rizk the court concluded that although the government may
not have made complete disclosure during pretrial discovery, by the
time of trial the defense had all of the pertinent information.1 03 The
court further noted that the defense conducted an extensive crossexamination of the informant at trial but waived cross-examination
of the agent for the Drug Enforcement Agency. 3 4 In fact, the court
observed, when the prosecutor began to inquire of the agent about
the fee arrangements, defense counsel objected on relevancy
grounds. 015 Thus, the requirements of Cervantes-Pachecowas found
to be met and the informant's testimony was properly admitted. 1°6
Apparently, in convicting the defendants, the jury believed that the
fee arrangement with the informant did not render him a hopelessly
biased and incredible witness. 107
B.

Impeachment and Access to Grand Jury Testimony
During pretrial discovery counsel will often obtain materials or
information which might be used for impeachment purposes at
trial.' 0 8 But gathering otherwise useful information may be limited

98. 826 F.2d at 315.
99. Id. at 315-16.
100. Id. at 316.
101. Id. The Rizk court noted that, generally, high fees for informants are considered
"suspect." 833 F.2d at 525 (citations omitted).
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

826 F.2d at 315-16; see FED. R. Evr. 104(e).
833 F.2d at 525.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 525-26.
See id.
See FED. R. Evm. 613(b) (addressing the use of prior inconsistent statements).
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by countervailing rules or laws limiting discovery-such as rule 6(e)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which blocks disclosure
09
of grand jury testimony.
In the case of In re Grand Jury Testimony" the plaintiff in a
civil racketeering suit requested the release of the grand jury testimony of the two defendants and another witness who had earlier
been acquitted of similiar federal criminal charges."' The plaintiff
wanted the information for impeachment and refreshment of recollection."12 The trial court ordered the release of the information
after the presiding judge in the criminal trials conluded that the the
need for secrecy in the grand jury proceedings was "for the most
part dissolved."" ' 3 The trial court, however, limited use of the grand
jury transcripts to the immediate trial and ordered that the plaintiff's
counsel would be personally liable for any unauthorized use of the
information." 1 4 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed." 5
Citing Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest' 16 and In re
Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation,"7 the court noted that
federal courts have long recognized the need to maintain the integrity of the grand jury system by protecting the proceedings with
some assurance of secrecy." 8 To that end, a party requesting grand
jury materials must demonstrate with particularity that there is a
compelling necessity for the materials." ' 9 The test for obtaining
grand jury transcripts under rule 6(e) is the three-pronged template
set out by the Supreme Court in Douglas Oil: The parties seeking
the transcripts must show "(1) that the material they seek is needed
to avoid possible injustice in another judicial proceeding, (2) that

109. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e).
110. 832 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. Oct. 1987).
Ill. Id. at 61. The defendants in the criminal case were charged in a 52-count federal
indictment which charged them, inter alia, with public bribery, mail fraud, and wire fraud.
Id. The first trial ended in a mistrial and they were acquitted at the second trial. Id. The civil
trial, brought under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, § 96 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-68 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), had been stayed until the completion of the criminal
proceedings. 832 F.2d at 61.
112. 832 F.2d at 63.
113. Id. at 62.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 64.
116. 441 U.S. 211 (1979).
117. 687 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1982).
118. 832 F.2d at 62.
119. Id. (citing United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958)).
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the need for disclosure is greater than the need for continued
secrecy, and (3) that their request is structured to cover material so

needed. "120
The court noted that impeachment and refreshment of recollection are reasons often cited for release1 21 and concluded that
while both are considered a valid "particular need," the need for
the grand jury testimony must be real. t22 Unless counsel can show
an actual inconsistency or inability to recall, it is "difficult to
confine disclosure 'strictly to those portions of a particular witness'
testimony at trial.' 123 This difficulty, moreover, sometimes requires that the requesting party first proceed through depositions
24
or questioning the parties at trial.1
As a model, the court cited its opinion in In re Corrugated
Container Antitrust Litigation 21 where it approved disclosure only
after the requesting party had failed to depose the witness, the
request had been narrowed, and the trial court had reviewed the
requested materials in camera.126 The court noted that at least one
circuit and numerous district courts have concluded that disclosure
of grand jury transcripts would be premature until an actual incon2 7
sistency or inability to recall had been demonstrated.
In In re Grand Jury Testimony the court stated that the plaintiff
had only presented the "hypothesis" of need. 2 s Although one of
the defendants had already been impeached during the criminal trial
with his prior grand jury testimony, which was thereafter a matter
of public record,' 29 the plaintiff nonetheless failed to show any
further inconsistencies which would warrant release of more portions

120. Id. (citing Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 222 (1979)).
121. Id. at 63 (citing In re Corrogated Container Antitrust Litigation, 687 F.2d 52, 55 (5th
Cir. 1982)).
122. Id.
123. Id. (citing 441 U.S. at 222 n.12).
124. Id.
125. 687 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1982).
126. See id. at 56.
127. 832 F.2d at 63 (citing Lucas v. Tanner, 725 F.2d 1095 (7th Cir. 1984); Grumman
Aerospace v. Titanium Metals Corp., 554 F. Supp. 771, 776 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); Index Fund,
Inc. v. Hagopian, 512 F. Supp. 1122, 1130 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Grand Jury, 469 F. Supp.
666, 670 (M.D. Pa. 1978); Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 37, 40 (N.D.
Il1. 1969)).
128. 832 F.2d at 64.
129. See id.
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of his grand jury testimony. 30 As for the other witnesses, the court
concluded that the request for release contained only "naked assertions" that the grand jury testimony was necessary for impeach3
ment or refreshment of recollection.1 '
The court noted that although the trial court had been properly
influenced by the fact that the criminal proceedings had ended, the
need for secrecy of grand jury proceedings continued because witnesses generally expect that only under unusual circumstances will
their testimony be made public. 3 2 Indirectly recognizing that requiring the trial courts to conduct in camera examinations of
requested grand jury materials would add to their workloads, the
court believed that such examination was necessary to protect grand
jury secrecy.' 33
This decision presents a balanced approach to the problem of
providing legitimate materials for impeachment and protecting the
sanctity of the grand jury proceedings. It seems a bit curious that
amidst calls for elimination of unnecessary discovery that the court
is now requiring depositions before ruling on whether to release
grand jury testimony."' Although deposition testimony will usually
demonstrate inconsistencies, it may be that other means may be
used just as effectively. The key inquiry should be whether an actual
need for access to the grand jury testimony has been shown, not
whether a pro forma deposition has been taken.
V.
A.

EXPERT OPINION TESTIMONY

Qualifications of Expert Witnesses

The federal appellate courts generally allow trial courts considerable leeway in deciding whether a particular witness is qualified
to testify as an expert. 3 5 Indeed, rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence sets out a broad category of reasons for considering a

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
39 (4th

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 63.
See generally S. SALTZBURO & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL
ed. 1986 & Supp. 1988) (collection of cases).
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witness to be an expert in a particular field. 3 6 Only if the trial
court's ruling to treat a witness as an expert has been "manifestly
erroneous" will the appellate court reverse the decision. 137
The Fifth Circuit addressed the qualifications of experts in both
West Wind Africa Line, Ltd. v. Corpus Christi Marine Services
Co.138 and Snyder v. Whittaker Corp.13 9 In West Wind the plaintiff
sought recovery of damages caused when the defendant provided
contaminated oil fuel for the plaintiff's ship. 140 At trial the plaintiff
offered testimony of two "experts" who, according to the defendant, were not qualified to testify as experts.' 41 Taking note of rule
702 and the requirement to show a manifestly erroneous ruling by
the trial court, the Fifth Circuit concluded that there was an "ample
basis" for permitting these witnesses to testify as experts. ' 2 The
first witness was a marine engineer and a consultant and an officer
in a marine engineering company' 3 who worked with fuels and
lubricants and was familiar with their relationship to power plants.' "
45
He was also active in the American Society of Testing Materials.
Presumably he testified on the quality of the fuel supplied by the
46
defendants and the damage that it caused to the ship's engines.
The second witness was an operations manager for a shipping
company and was familiar with the problems and the expenses
47
incurred by the plaintiff in diverting its ship for repairs.
Although the court concluded that both of these witnesses were
qualified to testify as experts, it made no detailed analysis to support
its conclusion.' 4 s Apparently, the court instead relied on the trial
court to determine whether, under the circumstances, these wit136. Rule 702 provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the
form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. Evus. 702.
137. See, e.g., Holmes v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 734 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1984);
Perkins v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 596 F.2d 681, 682 (5th Cir. 1979).
138. 834 F.2d 1232 (5th Cir. Jan. 1988).
139. 839 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. Mar. 1988).
140. 834 F.2d at 1233-34.
141. See id. at 1235-36.
142. Id. at 1236.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See id.
147. Id.
148. See id.
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nesses' testimony would assist the trier of fact given their specialized
training and knowledge. This reliance is consistent with the federal
courts' deference to a trial court's ruling regarding a witness'
49
qualifications as an expert.1
In Snyder v. Whittaker Corp.5 0 the plaintiffs offered the expert
testimony of a witness who, according to the defendant, was a
"professional expert" who earned substantial income from testifying
at trials. 5 ' Although the defendant had waived the issue at trial by
failing to object, the court nonetheless noted that a witness is not
disqualified simply because he "spends substantially all of his time
consulting with attorneys and testifying ....
,12 Thus, it was not
plain error to permit the witness to testify as an expert. The court
added that the defendant had brought the witness' professional
status to the attention of the jury,' implying that the jury could
consider the witness' posture in deciding what weight, if any, to
give to his opinion. 54 This case recognizes the realities of modern
litigation which often involves a "battle of the experts,"'5 some of
whom make substantial sums of income serving as expert witnesses.

B.

Expert Opinions: Measuring the Foundations

Assuming that an expert witness is qualified under rule 702 to
state an opinion, the opinion must have some basis or foundation.
Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an
expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by
or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or
data need not be admissible in evidence. 5 6

149. See S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 135, at 638-39.
150. 839 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. Mar. 1988).
151. Id. at 1089.
152. Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 103; In re Crash Disaster at New Orleans, 795 F.2d 1230,
1234 (5th Cir. 1986)).
153. Id.
154. See id.
155. See, e.g., Osburn v. Anchor Laboratories, Inc., 825 F.2d 908, 916 (5th Cir. 1987)
(case presenting a bona fide "battle of the experts").
156. FED. R. EvlD. 703.
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According to the notes of the advisory committee, the rule was
intended to broaden, at least in part, the common law bases upon
which experts could rest their opinions. 5 7 Notwithstanding this
liberalization of the rules governing expert testimony, the Fifth
Circuit, during the survey period, indicated that no matter how well
qualified the expert may be, there must be some reliable basis for
the resulting opinion offered at trial.
In Viterbo v. Dow Chemical Co.' 5 8 the plaintiffs brought suit
against the defendant chemical company alleging toxic effects of
the herbicide Tordon 10K. 5 9 The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendant on the grounds that the plaintiffs
could not prove causation and, in the alternative, that the plaintiffs'
expert testimony was not admissible under rules 703 and 403.160 The
6
Fifth Circuit affirmed. 1
In an attempt to discover the cause of an apparent chemical
62
reaction, a medical doctor ran a battery of tests upon the plaintiff.
Based solely upon the results of those tests and the patient's oral
medical history, the doctor was prepared to testify that, in his
opinion, Tordon 10K had caused the alleged toxic reaction. 63 Concluding that this testimony would be inadmissible, the district court
noted that the doctor had no experience with Tordon 10K and that
none of the plaintiff's four physicians stated that Tordon 10K was
the cause.' 6" The court noted the liberalization of the common law
rules of admitting expert testimony and the role of the jury as an
"arbiter" in resolving conflicting opinions and stated:
As a general rule, questions relating to the bases and sources of
an expert's opinion affect the weight to be assigned that opinion
rather than its admissibility and should be left for the jury's
consideration. In some cases, however, the source upon which
an expert's opinion relies is of such little weight that the jury
should not be permitted to receive that opinion. Expert opinion
testimony falls into this category when that testimony would not

157.
158.
159.
on their
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. advisory committee's note.
826 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. Sept. 1987).
Id. at 421. Tordon 10K is a pesticide used by the plaintiffs to eliminate tallow trees
property. Id.
Id.
Id. at 424.
Id. at 421.
See id. at 422.
Id.

EVIDENCE

1989]

actually assist the jury in arriving at an intelligent and sound
verdict. If an opinion is fundamentally unsupported, then it
offers no expert assistance to the jury. Furthermore, its lack of
reliable support may render it more prejudicial than probative,
making it inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.161
Neither the plaintiff's oral medical history, 166 the tests conducted by the expert, 167 nor the study of the effect of a chemical
called picloram on rats168 provided a sufficient foundation or basis
for the doctor's testimony. 69 The court indicated that while an
expert is not required to discredit every other possible cause of a
condition, 7 0 here, however, the doctor had admitted that a number
of elements may have caused plaintiff's condition and yet he simply
picked the cause offered by plaintiff himself-the one cause most
advantageous to the plaintiff's claim.' 7' The court concluded that
the doctor's testimony was "nothing more than [the plaintiff's]
testimony dressed up and sanctified as the opinion of the expert.
Without more credentials and a subjective opinion, an expert's
72
testimony that 'it is so' is not admissible.'"1
The court reached a similar result in Washington v. Armstrong
World Industries, Inc. 173 There, the plaintiff, the wife of a colon
cancer victim, alleged that her husband's cancer had been caused
by thirty-two years of exposure to asbestos in a product manufactured by the defendant. 74 The defendant obtained a summary

165. Id. (citations omitted).
166. Id. at 421. The plaintiff indicated that on December 24, 1981, three months after
beginning periodic use of Tordon 10K, he first experienced symptoms attributable to the
chemical: he cried, felt nervous, and experienced itching on his arms and legs. Id.
167. Id. Beginning in 1982, the plaintiff saw a number of doctors, including psychiatrists,
who diagnosed his problems as "endogenous depression, depressive neurosis, essential hypertension, and allergies." Id. The plaintiff's expert, a medical doctor, ran a blood test on the
plaintiff in April 1984 which indicated a presence of dieldrin, a herbicide, in his blood. Id.
When he was exposed to a small sample of Tordon 10K, however, he showed no reaction.
Id. Additional tests showed that the plaintiff had renal failure and hypertension and that he
was allergic to a variety of molds. Id.
168. Id. at 424. It is not entirely clear why the expert offered the results of this study.
That point was not lost on the court, which stated that it was "left to conclude that the study,
at most, is only evidence that picloram may produce some unidentified effect on humans."
Id.
169.

Id.

170.
171.
172.
173.

Id.
Id.
Id.
839 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. Mar. 1988).

174.

Id. at 1122.
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judgment after offering the affidavits of three physicians. 17 1
The first physician, who had performed the cancer operation
on the plaintiff's husband, indicated that he had seen no evidence
of asbestos exposure. 176 The second physician, who reviewed pathology specimens of the deceased which indicated no evidence of
asbestos bodies or fibers in any tissue examined, concluded that
"there is no pathologic basis to even speculate that asbestos was a
factor in the development of [the plaintiff's] tumor.' 1 77 A third
physician, who had been the personal doctor for the plaintiff's
husband for many years, indicated that asbestosis had never been
diagnosed or referred to in his medical records. 178 The plaintiff
offered no rebuttal evidence and the district court granted summary
judgment. 179 On a motion to reconsider, however, she offered the
affidavit of another physician who had never treated her husband
but, after reviewing his medical records, indicated that there was a
reasonable medical probability that asbestos exposure had caused
the cancer. 180 His explanation for the other physicians' conclusions
that no asbestos was present was that "customary examination
procedures used in pathology may not have been sensitive enough
to detect asbestos fibers.'' 1 8 The district court found this last
affidavit to be pure speculation and re-entered its summary judg82
ment. 1
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court.8 3 Citing its opinion
in Viterbo v. Dow Chemical Co. ,181 the court concluded that the
expert's opinion lacked foundation and reliability.' 5 According to
the court, the opinion was based upon examinations performed by
three other physicians who reached the conclusion that asbestos was
not found in the decedent's body.8 6 The court assumed, for the
purposes of argument, that there was a link between asbestos and

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id.; see FED. R. Crv. P. 56.
839 F.2d at 1122.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1124.
826 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. Sept. 1987).
839 F.2d at 1124.
Id.
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colon cancer, but here the expert had failed to connect that data
to the decedent's cancer.' 7 In short, the expert's opinion "lacked
probative value because it was pure speculation based on negative
inferences drawn from the testimony of three treating physicians."'8 8
It would be incorrect to conclude that this expert's opinion was
rejected simply because he had not previously examined the plaintiff's husband. Rule 703 is not that narrow. 18 9 However, the rule
does indicate that where such first-hand knowledge is not available,
it may be extremely difficult to prove that a particular condition
existed where those who had such first-hand exposure reached an
opposite conclusion. 190 In this case, the plaintiff's expert was left
with explaining away the opposing opinions by suggesting that they
missed crucial evidence. 19 1 Such an argument might carry greater
weight in a case where the evidence of the condition is exceedingly
difficult to discover. The court here implicitly concluded, however,
that it was simply incredible to believe that three apparently unbiased physicians would somehow completely miss discovering any
form of asbestosis. 192 The lesson of Washington and Viterbo is that
the Fifth Circuit recognizes that litigation sometimes involves a
"battle of the experts," but that in the process the battle must be
bona fide and consist of reliable, nonspeculative opinions.
C. Expert Testimony: The Controversial Opinion
Obviously the opinions offered by experts at a trial are often
in direct conflict. 193 Should the trial court, however, admit an
opinion which is not generally accepted in the particular scientific
community? In Osburn v. Anchor Laboratories,Inc. 194the plaintiffs
alleged that a veterinary chloramphenicol oral solution produced by

187.

Id.

188. Id.
189. See FED. R. EVID. 703. The advisory committee stated that an expert may permissibly
base his opinion on "presentation of data to the expert outside of court and other than by
Id.
his own perception" including "reports and opinions from . . . other doctors .....
advisory committee's note.
190. See id.
191. See 839 F.2d at 1123.
192. Id. at 1124.
193. See generally 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 563 (Chadbourne
rev. 1979) (discussing the problems inherent in expert testimony).
194. 825 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. Aug. 1987), cert. denied sub nor. Rachelle Laboratories, Inc.
v. Osbum, __

U.S. __

, 108 S. Ct. 1476, 99 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1988).
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the defendants had caused leukemia in one of the plaintiffs.195 After
using the product in his work for eighteen months, the plaintiff
was tentatively diagnosed by his family physician as having leukemia. 196 Further tests, including a bone marrow biopsy, confirmed
the preliminary diagnosis. 97 At trial, the plaintiffs presented the
expert testimony of two "well-qualified" expert witnesses who opined
that the plaintiff's exposure to the chemical caused the leukemia,
even though it had not first caused "aplastic

anemia."198 The

defendants responded by arguing that "because the notion that
chloramphenicol can cause leukemia without first causing aplastic
anemia has not been widely accepted in the medical field," there
was no evidence of causation. 99 The court responded:
This argument misses the point. An expert's opinion need
not be generally accepted in the scientific community before it
can be sufficiently reliable and probative to support a jury
finding. What is necessary is that the expert arrived at his
causation opinion by relying on methods that other experts in
his field would reasonably rely upon in forming their own,
possibly different opinions, about what caused the patient's
disease. Thus, medical expert opinion testimony that is controversial in its conclusions can support a jury finding of causation
as long as the doctor's conclusory opinion is based upon well2
founded methodologies. 00
The court held that the plaintiffs' experts relied upon their
particular areas of expertise, the patient's medical history, and
scientific studies reported in generally accepted medical literaturemethodologies "relied upon generally by physicians in diagnosing
etiology of a particular patient's disease. ' 20 ' The fact that the
defendants' experts, who relied on the same methodologies, reached
a different conclusion simply represents a "bona fide 'battle of the

195. Id. at 910. The plaintiffs were husband and wife. Id. The husband had been exposed
to the chemical while working with sick cattle in his job as a "cowboy" in the Texas panhandle.
Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 914-15. One of the plaintiff's experts testified that because Mr. Osburn had
not consulted a doctor in the 18 months he had handled the chemical, it was entirely feasible
that he had suffered from aplastic anemia without realizing his condition. Id. at 915 n.9.
199. Id. at 915.
200. Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
201. Id. at 915-16.

1989]

EVIDENCE

experts.' ",202 In cases such as these, the jury is charged with making
credibility determinations and weighing the conflicting evidence. 2 3
It is important to note the distinction between this case, which
addresses a controversial medical opinion, and those cases in which
there is controversy regarding the underlying scientific methods of
analysis used to support an opinion. In the case of the former, as
recognized in Osburn, the controversial opinion should be admissible
as long as it is otherwise reliable and nonspeculative. 2° The contro-

versial aspects of the expert's opinion are properly matters which
the jury may consider in reaching its decision. 20 5 In the case of a
controversy regarding the underlying methods of analysis, however,
the judge must first determine whether the threshold test of Frye
v. United States,20 6 or some similar test, has been satisfied. In Frye,
the court held that scientific evidence must have "gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs" before it
could be admitted as expert testimony. 207 Some jurisdictions have
recently opted for a relaxation of Frye and applied a multi-factored
template which focuses on the "relevance" of the novel scientific
evidence .208
VI.
A.

HEARSAY

In General

Perhaps some of the most difficult rules of evidence to understand and apply are the "hearsay" rules which are codified in the

202. Id.
203. Id.; see also FED. R. Evm. 104(e) (allowing party to introduce evidence relevant to
weight or credibility).
204. See 825 F.2d at 915-16 & n.13.
205. Id. at 916.
206. 293 F.2d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
207. Id. at 1014. See generally Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence:
Frye v. United States, A Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980) (discussing
history and trends in the admissibility of novel scientific evidence).
208. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 716 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, pet. ref'd); H.
WENDORF & D. SCHLUETER, TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 274-76 (2d ed. 1988); see also
S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 633 (4th Ed. 1986)
(determining, that the ultimate question for the trial judge under either the Frye test or the
"relevance" analysis should be whether both sides have had the opportunity to test the validity
of the scientific results).
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Federal Rules of Evidence. 20 9 As defined in rule 801, " '[h]earsay'
is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying
at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of
the matter asserted.

' 210

If the statement is offered for some reason

other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted, it is not

hearsay. 21 l Rule 801 also contains a listing of statements which do

not constitute hearsay and are admissible for the truth of the matter
asserted although technically they would otherwise be considered as
hearsay.

21 2

If the offered statement is not admissible as nonhearsay, it may
nonetheless be admissible under one of the myriad exceptions to
the hearsay rule in rules 803213 and 804.214 During the survey period,
the Fifth Circuit addressed several aspects of the hearsay rule
including co-conspirators' statements ,21 the business records exception, 216 and the admissibility in a criminal trial of a deposition taken
21 7
in a previous civil trial.
B.

Hearsay: Admissibility of Co-Conspirators' Statements

In United States v. Ascarrunz21t a government undercover agent
named Lugo and and a government informant discussed the purchase of cocaine with an individual named Silva who was targeted
as the "source. ' 219 When the drugs were delivered, the defendant
was introduced to the government agents as Silva's pilot.220 After
the defendant had unloaded the drugs from the airplane and placed
them in Lugo's car, the defendant made incriminating statements. 22'

209. See FED. R. EvWD. 801-05.
210. Id. 801(c).
211.
See, e.g., Snyder v. Whittaker Corp., 839 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. Mar. 1988) (holding
that memorandum concerning the strength of a product was not hearsay because it was offered
only to show that statements within the memorandum had been made, not that they were
true).
212. FED. R. EvID. 801(d).
213. Id. 803.
214. See id. 804.
215.
United States v. Ascarrunz,
216.
Snyder v. Whittaker Corp.,
217.
United States v. McDonald,
218. 838 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. Feb.
219. Id. at 761.

220. Id.
221.

Id.

838 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. Feb. 1988).
839 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. Mar. 1988).
837 F.2d 1287 (5th Cir. Feb. 1988).
1988).
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When Lugo drove away with Silva, the defendant was arrested. 222
Meanwhile, on the trip to Laredo, Silva assured Lugo that the
defendant could be trusted and that the defendant's share of the
bounty would be discounted against money owed by the defendant
224
to Silva. 223 Silva was later arrested.

At trial the prosecution introduced the statements of both the
defendant and Silva under rule 801(d)(2)(E) as statements by coconspirators. 225 On appeal of his conviction, the defendant argued
that because there was little evidence to support a finding that any
conspiracy existed, the jury should not have heard Silva's statements
226
in the absence of a cautionary instruction.

The court rejected this argument noting that the trial court had
held a hearing as required by United States v. James227 in determining as a preliminary matter whether a conspiracy existed. 22 The
court noted that the intervening decision by the Supreme Court in
Bourjaily v. United States2 29 indicated that a trial court may consider
the offered co-conspirator statements themselves in determining
whether there was a conspiracy. 230 In this case, even though the
trial court had not considered the two offered statements, the
relaxed standards of Bourjaily, said the court, would nonetheless
support the admission of the statements. 21
The court also rejected the argument that the statements by
Silva, which implicated the defendant, should not have been admitted because at the time they were made the defendant had already
been arrested and, thus, they were not made in the course and
furtherance of the conspiracy. 232 While the statements of an arrested
conspirator cannot be used against his co-conspirators, 233 other

222.
223.
224.

Id.
Id.
Id.

225.

Id. at 762; see FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).

226. 838 F.2d at 761.
227. 590 F.2d 575, 581 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979).
228. 838 F.2d at 762.
229. 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
230. See 838 F.2d at 762.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. See e.g., United States v. Barnes, 586 F.2d 1052, 1059 (5th Cir. 1978); United States
v. Muller, 550 F.2d 1375, 1379 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 971 (1977).
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circuit courts have held, 23 4 and the Fifth Circuit has recognized, 235
that the statements of an unarrested co-conspirator who is still
acting in furtherance of the conspiracy may be used against the
arrested co-conspirator. 23 6 The court further noted that the drafters
of rule 801 adopted an agency approach to co-conspirator statements. 237 Thus, while an arrested defendant's statements would
generally not be in furtherance of the conspiracy, an unarrested co23
conspirator may still be acting as an agent of the arrested party.
Applying this rationale to the facts, the court concluded that
because Silva's statements to Lugo were "meant to allay any suspicions Lugo might harbor [against the defendant,] they thus were
made in furtherance of the conspiracy. 2 1 9 Accordingly, Silva's
statements were admissible against the defendant under rule
20
801(d)(2)(E). .
A different result might have occurred in this case had the
defendant "withdrawn" from the conspiracy. In that case it would
be difficult for the prosecution to show that Silva's statements,
following the defendant's "withdrawal," were in furtherance of the
conspiracy. The court recognized, however, that case law permits
admission of statements made by an unarrested party against an
arrested party. 24 This is a recognition that an arrest does not, as a
matter of law, operate as a withdrawal.
C.

Hearsay: The Business Records Exception

In Snyder v. Whittaker Corp. ,242 a boating accident case, the
plaintiffs offered a memorandum found during pretrial discovery

234. See United States v. Taylor, 802 F.2d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1094 (1987); United States v. Disbrow, 768 F.2d 976, 982 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474

U.S. 1023 (1985).
235. United States v. Register, 496 F.2d 1072, 1079 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub noma.
Cochran v. United States, 419 U.S. 1120 (1975); Hornsby v. United States, 419 U.S. 1120

(1975).
236.

838 F.2d at 762-63.

237.

Id.

238. Id. at 762 (citation omitted).
239. Id. at 763. In reaching this result, the court noted that it had "shunned an overly
literal interpretation" of the phrase "in furtherance of the conspiracy." Id. (citing United
States v. Rodgriquez, 689 F.2d 516, 519 (5th Cir. 1982)).
240. Id.
241. Id. at 762-63.

242. 839 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. Mar. 1988).
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in the files of the defendant corporation who had manufactured
the boat. 243 The memo, labelled the "Baltek memo," was between
two officers in the sales division of the Baltek company and indicated the results of a computer analysis on certain boat building
materials. 2"4 The writer of the memo indicated that a copy of the
memo should have been given to Desco Marine. 245 At trial the

defendant objected that the memo was inadmissible hearsay. 246 The
plaintiff responded that the memo was admissible under the business
247
record exception to the hearsay rule.

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the defendant that the
memo did not qualify as a business record. 248 The court noted that:
The proponent of a document offered under the business record
exception must show that the document was prepared in the
regular course of its author's business. [The plaintiff] at most
offered evidence that the Baltek memorandum was written by
Baltek employees and received and kept by Desco. This showing
does not suffice under Rule 803(6).249
The court held, however, that the memorandum was used primarily
to cross-examine the defendant's expert, and for that purpose was
not hearsay. 2 0 Although the jury was not instructed to limit its use
21
of the memo, the Fifth Circuit held that any error was harmless.
Without using the term, the court apparently applied the requirement of "business duty" to rule 803(6).252 An argument can

243. Id. at 1088.
244. Id. at 1090. At trial the parties offered contradictory expert testimony on the durability
of the shrimp boat which sank claiming the lives of two seaman. Id. at 1089. The issue of
the qualifications of the plaintiff's expert, as a "professional witness," is discussed supra at
notes 150-55 and accompanying text.
245. 839 F.2d at 1090.
246. Id.
247. Id.; see FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
248. 839 F.2d at 1090.
249. Id. (emphasis in original) (citing United States v. Tafoya, 757 F.2d 1522, 1528-29 (5th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 921 (1985); United States v. Rosenstein, 474 F.2d 705, 70910 (2d Cir. 1973); Hussein v. Isthmian Lines, Inc., 405 F.2d 946, 948-49 (5th Cir. 1968)).
250. Id. The plaintiff's counsel was apparently attempting to show a misrepresentation and
that Desco had notice that the product it was using would require extra support. Id. The court
stated that the memo could not be used under rule 703 as data underlying an expert's opinion
because there was no showing that the memorandum "was of a type reasonably relied upon
by experts in the particular field." Id.
251. Id.
252. See generally S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 135, 831-32 (4th ed. 1986)
(taking the position that rule 803(6) should be read to require that the preparer was under a
business duty to keep such documents).
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be made that the reliability concerns in rule 803(6) are satisfied
where the business routinely relies on information supplied by
persons outside the business. 2 3 However, the advisory committee
note to rule 803(6) clearly indicates an intent to limit the exception
to cases where the source of the recorded information has a business
duty to maintain such information. 254 In reaching its decision in
this case, the court did not cite the earlier opinion of Mississippi
River Grain Elevator, Inc. v. Bartlett & Co., Grain25 5 where it
indicated that the business records exception did not require that
the disputed records be prepared by the company which has pos256
session of the record.

D.

Hearsay: Admissibility of Civil Depositions in a Criminal
Case
In an apparent case of first impression for the Fifth Circuit,
the court in United States v. McDonald 57 considered the issue of
whether a defendant in a criminal case could offer a civil deposition
of a co-defendant against the prosecution. 21 In McDonald the two
co-defendants, McDonald and Minteer, conducted a series of fraudulent insurance transactions involving the American National Insurance Company ("ANICO").2 9 ANICO filed a civil suit against
both McDonald and Minteer. 2 60 While that suit was pending a

federal indictment alleging mail fraud was returned against both
defendants. 261 At the criminal trial, McDonald attempted to offer
the deposition testimony of his co-defendant Minteer under rule
804(b)(1) 262 for the purpose of showing why certain payments had

253. See, e.g., United States v. Lieberman, 637 F.2d 95, 99-101 (2d Cir. 1980) (hotel
registration cards admissible even though filled out by third persons); United States v. Reese,
568 F.2d 1246, 1252 (6th Cir. 1977) (newspaper articles regularly maintained in hospital files).
See generally Griffin, The Big Civil Case and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 49 TEMP. L.Q.
898, 904-07 (1976) (concluding that rule 803(6) "does not require transmission of information
from someone within the business activity").
254. See S. SAITZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 135, at 831-32 (4th ed. 1986).
255. 659 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981).
256. Id. at 1318-19.
257. 837 F.2d 1287 (5th Cir. Feb. 1988).
258. Id. at 1290.
259. Id. at 1289.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. See id. at 1290-91. On appeal the defendant argued that the former testimony should
have been admissible under rule 804(b)(5), a form of the residual hearsay exception, but
counsel had failed to raise that point at the trial and thus the court considered it waived. Id.
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been made by McDonald to Minteer. 263 The trial court excluded the
2
evidence. 1
As to the use of former testimony where the declarant has been
adjudged unavailable, rule 804(b)(1) provides that:
Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same
or different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance
with law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the
party against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil
action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opporthe testimony by direct,
tunity and similar motive to 2 develop
65
cross, or redirect examination.

The issue in this case, as identified by the court, was whether the
language "predecessor in interest" applied to these facts. 266 The
prosecution argued that rule 804(b)(1) applies only where the deposition taken in a civil case is offered in another civil action. 267 The
defendant argued that the language "in a civil case" only indicated
the type of proceeding in which the deposition was taken and not
268
the type of proceeding at which the deposition was later offered.
While the court rejected the prosecution's argument for a per
se exclusion making rule 804(b)(1) inapplicable in criminal cases, it
noted that the meaning of the language "predecessor in interest"
and "in a civil trial" was debatable.2 69 The court noted that there

263. Id. at 1290.
264. Id.
265. FED. R. EvlD. 804(b)(1) (emphasis added).
266. 837 F.2d at 1291.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. In the original version of the rule as submitted by the Supreme Court, the former
testimony could be offered if the party against whom it was now offered, or a party "with
similar motive and interest," had had an opportunity to examine the witness. 46 F.R.D. 161,
377 (1969); see FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) advisory committee note. The House Committee,
however, changed the rule to the current language because "it is generally unfair to impose
upon the party against whom the hearsay evidence is being offered responsibility for the
manner in which the witness was previously handled by another party." House Committee on
the Judiciary, Federal Rules of Evidence, H.R. REP. No. 650, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 4, 15,
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMN. NEws 7051, 7088. The Senate concurred because
the change was slight. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, S. REP. No. 1277, 93rd Cong., 2d
Sess. 4, 28, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 7051, 7074. The commentators
are split on whether the congressional change signaled a requirement of privity between the
party in the case at bar and the predecessor in interest. Cf. TEX. R. Cim. EviD. 804(b)(1)
(limiting the exception to those situations where the "party against whom the testimony is

now offered, had an opportunity and similar motive"). Compare E.

CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON

TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:427

seems to be agreement that the requirement of a predecessor in
interest clause is inapplicable where the former testimony is being
offered against a criminal defendant but did not indicate an opinion
on whether it agreed with that position.2 70 The court noted that
there is a split of authority on the issue of whether former testimony
27
may ever be offered against the prosecution. '
The Tenth Circuit, in several cases, has concluded that the
former testimony is not admissible against the prosecution unless
the prosecution had the opportunity to participate in the preceding
civil action and examine the witnesses whose former testimony was
being offered. 272 On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit has adopted
a more flexible position and has applied a "similarity of motive"
test. In United States v. Feldman273 that court developed a list of
factors for determining whether the motive to develop the testimony
in the civil proceeding was sufficiently similar to the motive that
the party would have in the present criminal proceeding: "(1) The
type of proceeding in which the testimony is given, (2) trial strategy,
(3) the potential penalties or financial stakes, and (4) the number
274
of issues and parties."
The Fifth Circuit indicated that it preferred the Seventh Circuit's test because it served as "a better servant of Rule 804(b)(1),
and a defendant's right to obtain evidence in his defense ..
275
The court noted that the language "predecessor in interest" contemplates that the litigant will not have had a personal opportunity
to examine the witness. 276 Moreover, if a civil litigant and the
government in a later criminal case have "sufficiently similiar
incentives to develop the testimony" the court could see no reason

§ 256, at 764 (3d ed. 1984) (privity between parties as a requirement is "indefensibly
strict") with S. SALTZEURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 135, at 954 (4th ed. 1986) ("predecessor
in interest" means something more than similar motives and interests). See generally H.
WENDORF & D. SCBLUETER, TExAS RuLES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 359-61 (2d ed. 1988) (brief
summary and discussion of the ambiguities in rule 804(b)(1)).
270. 837 F.2d at 1291; see also 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE
804(b)(1)[051 (1987) (review of authorities and scholars adopting both positions).
271. See 837 F.2d at 1291-92.
272. Id. at 1292; see United States v. Kapnison, 743 F.2d 1450, 1458-59 (10th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1015 (1985); United States v. Harenberg, 732 F.2d 1507, 1516 (10th
Cir. 1984).
273. 761 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1985).
274. Id. at 385.
275. 837 F.2d at 1292.
276. Id.
EVIDENCE
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to conclude that the defendant would necessarily and always be
2
blocked from offering that testimony. "1

Applying that test to the facts, the court concluded that although the government and ANICO had similar status in their
claims against the witness, their trial stategies were sufficiently
dissimilar to block Minteer's deposition testimony.278 Because his
deposition was taken before the indictment was returned, and knowing that it could cross-examine Minteer at the civil trial, ANICO
did not have the same incentives to develop inaccuracies in his
deposition testimony. 2 9 In the criminal trial, Minteer did not testify
and, knowing that, the prosecution would have had a "strong
incentive to develop fully the testimony at the time of the deposition. ''2 0

This case presents a balance. While the approach taken by the
Tenth Circuit apparently forecloses any use of former testimony
against the prosecution, 2 ' the Seventh Circuit approach,

28 2

now

Circuit, 2 3

applicable in the Fifth
is a balanced and principled
approach which takes into consideration the possibility that in some
cases, a sufficient similarity of motive may exist to permit the
defendant to offer the former testimony against the prosecution.
VII.

CONCLUSION

These cases are for the most part unremarkable. In none of
them was there a dissenting opinion on the evidentiary issues.
However, in some respects, they do represent a continuing refinement of the Federal Rules of Evidence and to that extent provide
helpful assistance to the bench and the bar who must apply the
rules. In at least one instance the court addressed an issue for the
first time - the admissibility of former testimony from a civil
proceeding in a subsequent criminal case. 21 4 In another it adopted
a three-part test for determining the admissibility of mug shots.2 5

277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

Id. at 1292-93.
Id. at 1293.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 273-74 and accompanying text.
See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
See supra note 257-80 and accompanying text.
See supra note 40-61 and accompanying text.
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Throughout, the court continued its reputation for careful and
prudent analysis of difficult evidentiary issues.

